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THE FREEDOM OF CIVILIANS OF
ENEMY NATIONALITY TO DEPART FROM
TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY A HOSTILE
BELLIGERENT*
by Dr. Walter L. Williams, Jr.**

I. INTRODUCTION
The progressive development of international law pertaining to
protection of civilians in armed conflict continues to be a matter of
signficant interest to military lawyers and legal scholars. This article addresses an important aspect of that subject, the freedom of
civilians of enemy nationality to depart from territory controlled by
a hostile belligerent. Neither diplomatic discourse nor legal literature has focused on this topic in recent times. However, terminating
hostile belligerent control over civilians at the earliest practicable
time has always been highly relevant to the humanitarian objective
of protecting civilians in time of war. This is increasingly so in the
context of modern armed conflict. In dealing with this quite substantial topic, this article assuredly does not present a full appraisal of
the many questions involved. The discussion offers an impressionistic, exploratory inquiry only into certain issues and encourages
future dialogue and contribution in developing definitive analysis
useful both for governmental advisors and legal scholars. In keeping
with the aims of the law pertaining to protection of civilians in armed
conflict, the observational perspective is that of a citizen of the world
community recommending to decision-makers policies reflecting
community aspirations and appropriate rules calculated to more
effectively implement those policies.

*The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of The Judge Advocate General's School, the Department of the Army, or any other governmental entity.
**Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, The College of William and
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. B.A., M.A., LL.B., University of Southern California;
LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University. Lieutenant Colonel, the Judge Advocate General's
Corps, United States Army Reserve.
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The methodology1 underlying this presentation emphasizes three
aspects. The first is a requirement for comprehensive factual analysis of any particular instance of armed conflict. This analysis is
contextual, viewing that conflict within the context of the existing
global process of power in which states interact by various strategies
to secure and maintain effective power positions in their relations.
The second aspect is trend analysis of the course of legal decision
concerning the right of civilians of enemy nationality to depart from
territory controlled by a hostile belligerent. This is an analysis that,
as regards past trends, properly considers the present and future
effects of new conditions pertinent to the conduct of modern armed
conflicts. The third aspect is a policy-oriented analysis of trends of
legal decision, an appraisal of trends in light of advocated world
community policies seeking the maximum protection of enemy civilians in modern armed conflicts. It is suggested that only through
such a methodology may one expect accurately to determine the
present developments in the rules pertaining to the freedom of
movement of enemy civilians, to project those developments into the
future, and to appraise the consequences of those developments.

II. THE CONTEXT OF MODERN ARMED
CONFLICT: INCREASED RISKS TO ENEMY
CIVILIANS
A. INCREASING RESORT TO ARMED FORCE
In addressing the subject of the freedom of enemy civilians to
depart from territory controlled by a hostile belligerent, the first
proposition is that, unfortunately, the foreseeable trend in international relations suggests that armed conflict situations placing civilians in grave risk will occur with increasing frequency. The trend
over the last twenty years has been one of steady erosion of legal
constraints on the use of armed force in international relations.
Increasingly, prohibitions embodied in the United Nations Charter,
other conventions, and customary international law receive lip service or are ignored. United Nations Security Council decisions and
orders rendered under supposedly controlling authority of Chapter
1A concise discussion of the methodology used in this article is presented in
McDougal, Lasswell, & Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188 (1963), and McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 Ga. L. Rev. 1 (1966). Detailed application of this approach is
illustrated in M. McDougal & F. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order:
The Legal Regulation of International Coercion (1961). European readers will find a
discussion in McDougal, International Law, Power, and Policy: A Contemporary
Conception, 82 Hague Recueil des Cours 137 (1953).
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Seven of the Charter frequently are viewed, at best, as recommendations or else are simply disregarded or even derided by some states.
Despite the lessons of two world wars and bloody regional and binational struggles of this century, many states today seem bent on
"national tribalism", enthusastically bashing their neighbors with
modern "war clubs" of sophisticated weaponry. To paraphrase the
Irish poet Yeats, the "center" simply is not holding. To chart even the
more salient points of this trend or to analyze the various explanatory
factors is beyond the scope of this discussion. It is merely noted that
this increasing trend to resort to unilateral use of armed force for
both aggressive and defensive objectives occurs in the context of
continued absence throughout the world community of the will to
establish strong global and regional community agencies possessing
the authority and the means to deter or to terminate impermissible
uses of armed force in international relations. The bloody war
between Iran and Iraq, the "serial" conflicts in Arab-Israeli relations, tragically evidenced recently in Lebanon, the spreading pattern of transborder violence in Central America, the recent
Argentine-British conflict over the Falklands, and the continuing
Soviet violence in Afghanistan are merely more notorious instances
of this trend. This is already a bleak picture, but it is suggested that
this is merely the early stage of a still more precipitous descent of
much of the world down the deadly slope of death and destruction
resulting from modern armed conflict.
Consequently, the increasing number of instances of armed conflict necessarily will subject great numbers of civilians to risks of
death, injury, and other deprivations. Thus, the maximum development of and adherence to the rules of armed conflict pertaining to
protection of civilians, including the principle of freedom of enemy
civilians to depart from territory controlled by a hostile belligerent,
become every more compelling.

B. SPECIFIC ADVERSE FACTORS IN MODERN
ARMED CONFLICTS
Concurrently, as the tragic increase in international armed conflict brings grave risks to larger numbers of civilians, certain features of present and future conflicts suggest that the intensity of
those risks likewise will increase. Briefly and with primary focus on
enemy civilians present in territory controlled by a hostile belligerent, some of those adverse factors will be discussed.
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1. Development in Modern Weaponry and the Problem of Movement

Within Territory Controlled by a Hostile Belligerent
a. Development in Modern Weaponry
One important factor is the dynamic developments in military
weaponry. With the enormously increased destructive range and
speed of modern weapon systems, the risks to civilians in or in the
proximity of target areas have increased enormously. Even if sufficient time exists to relocate civilians, and time often will be insufficient, the security of rear areas of combat zones or other locations
may be most illusory. The fluidity of modern combat and the consequences of human or mechanical error in use of weapon systems may
substantially endanger civilians relocated to supposedly safer areas.
Especially for smaller states, the entirety of national territory may
constitute one large combat zone.

b. Movement Within Territory Controlled by a Hostile Belligerent
With this expectation that civilians will encounter increasing difficulty in avoiding damage from modern military weaponry, the
extent to which the humanitarian law of armed conflict requires
hostile belligerents to relocate enemy civilians to safer areas or to
permit them to move to safer areas should be examined. In appraising the situation of enemy civilians present in territory controlled by
a hostile belligerent, two categories are considered: those who are in
the hostile belligerent's own territory and those in territory occupied
by the hostile belligerent. As regards the first group, the 1949
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War2 ("Civilian Convention") presently offers meager legal
protection from exposure to modern weaponry. If a hostile belligerent has refused to permit enemy civilians to depart from its territory,
the Civilian Convention does not require the Detaining Power to
relocate those civilians to a particularly safe location. As regards
internees, enemy civilians held under close custody of the Detaining
Power, the duty of the Detaining Power is merely to avoid the placement internment camps in areas "particularly exposed to the
dangers of war."3 The difference between the negative duty not to set
up an internment camp in close proximity to a military target and
the affirmative duty to place internees in a particularly safe location,
such as many miles from the anticipated zone of conflict, is selfevident. As regards enemy civilians not interned but still not allowed
to depart from the belligerent's territory, the Civilian Convention
26

U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (12 Aug. 1949).
3Civilian Convention, Art. 83.
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provides no duty of safe location whatsoever beyond "national treatment." If enemy civilians reside in an area "particularly exposed" to
the dangers of war, they have the right to move from that area "to the
same extent as the nationals of the States concerned."4 Thus, if the
hostile belligerent prevents its own nationals from moving, enemy
civilians have no right to move. Although not free to depart the
belligerent's territory if they wish, enemy civilians can be forced to
accept exactly the same extent of risks as the national populace.
Furthermore, from the wording of the Convention, enemy nationals
in areas not "particularly exposed" but in which there was some
reasonable risk from the conflict would seem to have not even the
;right to "national treatment." Thus, the hostile belligerent's nationals in an area not so endangered as to be "particularly" exposed to
risk might be quite free to move elsewhere, while, for avowed control
purposes, the belligerent lawfully could require enemy civilians to
remain.
The Civilian Convention does prohibit using protected persons to
render points or areas immune from military operations. 5 That duty,
however, concerns moving civilians to the location of military or
establishing activities that are military targets where civilians are
present in an attempt to make military targets immune from attack.
This is in line with the idea of not actively placing civilians, including
enemy civilians, in a place "particulary exposed" to risk. In the
Civilian Convention, the reference to establishing "safety zones,"
which applies for enemy and non-enemy civilians and in either a
belligerent's own territory or in occupied territory, is permissive, not
obligatory. Further, the provision covers categories of persons more
susceptible of injury. Thus, belligerents may establish "hospital and
safety zones and localities so organized as to protect from the effects
of war, wounded, sick and aged persons, children under fifteen,
expectant mothers and mothers of children under seven."6 As
regards enemy civilians in occupied territory, the Occupying Power
again has the duty of not using protected persons to render points or
areas immune from military operations. 7 However, the Civilian
Convention does not appear to create an affirmative duty to relocate
enemy civilians even if they are endangered greatly by the continued
conflict and circumstances of the Occupying Power's military security to make relocation feasible as long as the Occupying Power has
not established military activities in close proximity of civilians.
ld. at Art. 38(4).
ld. at Art. 28.
6ld. at Art. 14.
7/d. at Art. 28.
4

5
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Article 49, in permissive, not obligatory, language provides that the
Occupying Power may undertake total or partial evacuation of a
given area "if the security of the population or imperative military
reasons so demand." This right of the Occupying Power, rather than
a duty, is set forth as an exception from a general duty not to engage
in individual or mass forcible transfers in occupied territory.s Article 49 does give enemy civilians the right to move from an area
"particularly exposed to the dangers of war" by prohibiting the
Occupying Power from detaining them in such areas. That right is
limited, however, by authorizing the Occupying Power to detain 'the
enemy civilians if the "security of the population" or "imperative
military reasons so demand." As regards "security of population",
the purpose of the restrictive clause is to avoid the risk to the populace that could result if enemy civilians or other protected persons
were to seek to move en mass with no safety controls or in conditions
of immediate armed conflict.9 To justify prevention of movement on
grounds of military reasons, the need must be imperative, such as
significant hindrance to important military operations, not merely a
matter of military convenience to the Occupying Power. Thus,
although the Occupying Power has no general affirmative duty to
relocate enemy civilians to a safer location, those civilians do have the
individual right to choose to move to a safer location, albeit circumscribed by exceptions that, in situations of some civilian safety risk or
military difficulty, could be applied by the Occupying Power with
little expectation of successful challenge for abuse of discretion.
In summary, the development of modern military armament
increasingly will subject enemy civilians in territory controlled by a
hostile belligerent to much greater risks than in the past, despite the
best of reasonable, good faith efforts of a hostile belligerent to place
them in positions of sure safety. However, in contrast to this scenario
of increasing risk, the current law of protection of enemy civilians
does not obligate the hostile belligerent to make that effort, either in
its own territory or in occupied territory. In the belligerent's own
territory, the law creates only a highly limited obligation to allow the
enemy civilians to exercise individual choice to move to a safer zone.
8 Pictet's Commentary described the Occupying Power as having both the right and
duty of evacuation of inhabitants to places of refuge. However, this assertion is made
in the context ofthe inhabitants being endangered as the result of military operations.
J. Pictet (ed.), Commentary, IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War 280 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Pictet]. This situation
causes Article 28 to apply, with its duty of evacuation. Where military operations of
the Occupying Power have not placed the inhabitants in danger, Article 49 expresses
only a right of the Occupying Power to require evacuation.
9Pictet, supra note 8, at 283.
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c. Scarcity of Resources to Support Enemy Civilians
A second adverse factor to consider in the context of the trend in
modern armed conflicts is that the Civilian Convention envisions the
possibility of substantial resources being committed to the maintenance of enemy civilians. In the hostile belligerent's own territory,
the Convention entitles interned civilians, inter alia, to adequate
shelter, clothing, food, and medical services. 10 In occupied territory,
the Occupying Power has various support duties, including, if necessary, the duties to provide adequate food and medical supplies from
its own resources and to maintain adequate public hygiene and
health facilities. 11 Significant numbers of trained military and civilian personnel specialized in various skills are required to administer
support and control regimes concerning enemy civilians in territory
controlled by a hostile belligerent.
The implicit model for these requirements of substantial resource
commitments is that of conflict between states amply endowed with
these various resources and having them available for use in areas
perhaps well-removed from the combat zone. However, in a world
community overwhelmingly composed of "developing" states possessing meager quantities of these resources, the reality is that the
belligerents, or some of them, in most of the future armed conflicts
will possess these resources at extremely low levels even at the initial
stages of the conflict. This scarcity will be aggravated as resource
attrition occurs during combat. Related to the problem of safe location for enemy civilians is the fact that, in many instances, suitable
support facilities and personnel infrastructure may be available only
in or near urban centers, which may contain vital military targets.
To expect an undeveloped state in the throes of warfare to establish
anything but the most primitive of internment facilities or to provide
adequate resources to sustain enemy population in occupied territory when its own citizens are living in inadequate circumstances
would be most illusory. As regards enemy civilians detained but not
interned in a hostile belligerent's territory, Pictet tells us that, paradoxically, in World War II: "The living conditions of enemy civilians
who remained at liberty ... were sometimes more precarious than
those of internees."12 The Civilian Convention requires the Detaining
Power to provide for support of enemy civilians who are detained but
not interned if there is a nexus between their inability to support
themselves and the Detaining Power's control measures. Additionwcivilian Convention, Arts. 85, 89-91.
UJd. at Arts. 55, 56.
I2Pictet, supra note 8, at 249.
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ally, enemy civilians are entitled to national treatment concerning
employment, subject to security considerations. 13 However, establishing the grounds to cause this contingnent support duty to become
operative or to show violation of the national treatment standard for
employment could be most difficult. Situations of extreme hardship
could result. Ironically, Pictet noted that Article 42 of the Civilian
Convention requires the Detaining Power to intern an enemy civilian
who voluntarily requests internment and that the "voluntary"
request can be based on the miserable circumstances encountered if
not interned. 14 Thus, confinement may be accepted to acquire adequate support.

d. Ideological Animosity and Attitudes Toward Enemy Civilians
A third adverse factor bearing upon the welfare of enemy civilians
in territory controlled by a hostile belligerent is that the presence of
severe ideological animosity between belligerents is one of the realities of modern international armed conflict. This animosity may
result from excessively parochial nationalism or differences in political philosophy, race, religion, or ethnic background. Hostile attitudes toward enemy civilians may exist in any conflict if for no other
reason than the tragic losses suffered in combat. Additionally, ideological animosity or long-standing feuds based on past instances of
conflict or felt injustice may fuel the passions of the hostile belligerent's populace or military and result in excessive deprivations to
enemy civilians.

e. Insufficient Training and Control of the Hostile Belligerent's
Military Forces and Civilian Population
Finally, the risk of mistreatment of enemy civilians in many future
conflict situations is increased by the fact that the military forces of
many of the developing states are, unfortunately, not well trained
and disciplined and that, in many states, there is little evidence of
significant instruction of either the military forces or pertinent civilian groups in the law pertaining to the protection of enemy civilians. Further, the governments of many states today have major
difficulty in maintaining adequate public safety even in peacetime.
Frequently, foreign persons are the victims of hostile actions by
members of the populace. In crisis conditions of armed conflict,
many belligerents may simply be unable to fulfill their obligations to
protect enemy civilians from deprivations by either undisciplined
military personnel or by a violent populace. Defects in "personnel
Civilian Convention, Art. 39.
I4Pictet, supra note 8, at 259.

13
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infrastructure", combined with ideological animosity or hatred and
great difficulty in maintaining public order, provide a scenario for
grave risk to enemy civilians, especially to those present in the
belligerent's own territory. This level of risk undoubtedly would
increase as the conflict continues.

III. THE FREEDOM OF ENEMY CIVILIANS
TO DEPART FROM TERRITORY CONTROLLED
BY A HOSTILE BELLIGERENT
Given that the process of modern international armed conflict
generally involves substantially increased risks to enemy civilians
present in territory controlled by a hostile belligerent, the conclusion
follows that the freedom of enemy civilians to depart that territory
may in some instances be essential for their protection. In any event,
perspectives of fundamental human dignity require that, in the
absenc!=l of very substantial, countervailing considerations, enemy
civilians should be able to exercise freedom of choice to depart from
hostile belligerent control. Freedom of departure is a fundamental
aspect of freedom of personality, which is at the core of convern in the
humanitarian law of armed conflict. It is submitted that the Civilian
Convention should clearly obligate a hostile belligerent to allow
enemy civilians to depart from territory the belligerent controls as
long as no significant detriment is suffered by that belligerent or no
significant advantage accrues to the opposing belligerent. This view
is consistent with the fundamental balancing principle which underlies the humanitarian law of armed conflict. An examination of the
trends in the law in this area follows.

A. FREEDOM TO DEPART FROM THE
HOSTILE BELLIGERENT'S OWN TERRITORY
As the highly authoritative Pictet's Commentary 15 has noted, the
legal status of enemy civilians present in a belligerent's territory has
changed from that of slaves under Roman Law, to treatment as
prisoners of war in the time of Grotius, to persons free to leave a
belligerent's country under long-standing customary international
law. Consequently, by the time of negotiation of the Hague Regulations of 1907, 16 the draftsmen thought the inclusion of a provision
forbidding the prevention of enemy civilians from leaving a belligerent's territory was clearly unnecessary. In Pictet's words: "They felt
5/d. at 232.
Convention No. IV of October 18, 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land with Annex of Regulations, 36 Stat. 2777 (1910), T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention].
1

16 Hague
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it went without saying." 17 However, the drafter may have had much
more in perspective the experience of the past than the anticipation
of the experience of the future. By the eve of World War I, the
conception of the use in major conflicts of massive military forces
based upon compulsory military service was well established. With
this in mind, the practice at the onset of World War I, and even more
so for World War II, was to detain and to intern large numbers of
enemy civilians. Unfortunately, in that period, a widespread and
indiscriminate restraint of enemy civilians occurred. Although the
practices of states varied, many enemy civilians were detained and
interned. From any reasonable perspective of military necessity,
these detainees should have been permitted to leave the hostile belligerent's territory. Likewise, many were interned who, at the most,
should have deplorable conditions."18 Subsequent, ad hoc instances of
unilateral authorization to leave, or agreed exchanges, dealing with
children, the aged, the sick, and women brought tardy relief for
some. However, in many instances where some members of a family
were authorized to depart, relatives chose to remain together in what
was in effect a form of captivity, rather than separate. Unnecessary
controls over the freedom of enemy civilians to leave a belligerent's
territory led directly to unnecessary physical and emotional suffering, often extreme, by them and by their loved ones.
In a preliminary "Draft Convention" prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and adopted as a draft
convention by the XVth International Conference of the ICRC in
Tokyo in 1934, 19 the ICRC sought, inter alia, to establish a regime of
protections for detainees and internees. Further, the Draft Convention sought to limit a state's power to prevent enemy civilians from
leaving its territory to two categories: persons who were liable to be
mobilized in the military and persons whose departure "would
threaten the security of the State of residence in some other way."
With the outbreak of conflict in 1939, the Draft Convention failed to
enter into force and enemy nationality alone often was the basis for
detainement and internment. During the war, the ICRC was able,
for approximately 160,000 civilians of fifty different nationalities, to
arrange that internees be given the benefit, by analogy, of the provisions of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention.20

17 Pictet, supra note 8, at 232. See Wilson, Treatment of Civilian Alien Enemies, 37
Am. J. Int'l L. 32 (1943).
18Pictet, supra note 8, at 233.
19Jd.
20Jd.
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In 1949, the negotiators of the Civilian Convention dealt with the
right of enemy civilians to leave belligerent territory in Article 35.
That Article represents the present trend of decision. Article 35
states, in part: "All protected persons who may desire to leave the
territory at the onset of, or during, a conflict, shall be entitled to do so,
unless their departure is contrary to the national interests of the
State."21
As against the apparent recognition of the right of enemy civilians
to leave a belligerent's territory, one could hardly imagine a broader
right of discretion to prevent departure than the emphasized "limitation" on the right. The term, "national interests," which in today's
world has received the broadest possible interpretation in many
other contexts, stands totally undefined in Article 35. Pictet's Commentary asserted that "national interests" is broader than "security
considerations," the term used in the ICRC Tokyo Draft, which the
Diplomatic Conference negotiating the Civilian Convention had
rejected. 22 The Commentary noted, for example, that endangerment
to the national economy would fall within the meaning of the term,
since the Conference had "in mind, in particular, the case of countries of immigration, where the departure of too large a proportion of
aliens might prejudice national interests by creating manpower or
economic problems, etc."23 The Commentary correctly, albeit in
understatement, stated that "a great deal is thus left to the discretion
of the belligerents, who may be inclined to interpret 'national interests' as applying to many different spheres," and exhorted states to
show moderation by invoking national interests only in cases of
reasons of "utmost urgency," due to "the poor conditions in which
civilian aliens have all too often been detained."24
The present state of international law effectively permits hostile
belligerents to detain, at lesat for some period and possibly to detain
or intern for the duration of a lengthy conflict, virtually every ablebodied enemy civilian, regardless of age or sex.
In the past, the core of state practice was to detain and intern male
enemy civilians aged sixteen to sixty, the usual age range subject to
military service. Quite often, children and youth below the age of
sixteen, women in general and those of both sexes above the age of
sixty were permitted to leave the belligerent's territory. However,
Civilian Convention, Art. 35 (emphasis added).
Pictet, supra note 8, at 236.
23 /d. (citing II-A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949
653-54, 737-38; id., II-B 410.
24 Pictet, supra note 8, at 236.
21

22
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under an argument of minimal economic advantage to the enemy
civilians country or of minimal economic disadvantage to the belligerent in whose territory the enemy civilians are present, persons of
both sexes from the age of twelve or thirteen to the age of seventy or
beyond could justifiably be held by the hostile belligerent under the
amorphous term "national interests." With such a blanket authority
to prevent departure, the requirements of Article 35 that decision on
applications to leave be made "as rapidly as possible" in accordance
with "regularly established procedures", that the protected person
may have a refusal of the application reconsidered "as soon as possible" by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by
the Detaining Power, and that representatives of the Protecting
Power, at its request, must be furnished "as expeditiously as possible" the names of persons denied permission to depart and the reasons for denial, unless security reasons prevent it or the departed
person concerned protests, merely ensures in most instances the
observance of procedural niceties in exercising the virtually unbridled discretion of the Detaining Power to decide whom it will
detain. One would contend that surely babies, young children, the
very elderly, and the seriously ill or disabled have the clear right to
leave; an argument to prevent their departure on the ground of
national interests would be ludicrous. However, these persons are
those in greatest need of accompaniment by at least one adult, ablebodied family member and, if that were not permitted, then in the
great majority of cases those persons would not leave and, in effect,
be detained. Further, in cases where the enemy civilian has resided
for some time in the Detaining Power's territory, that state could
argue that, at the conflict's end, the detained persons might well
choose to remain and seek the return of departed family members,
potentially causing political, administrative, and economic difficulties for the Detaining Power. Therefore, the Detaining Power could
argue that the "national interests" concept would support maintaining the family unit together when the principal adult members of the
family are detained. Thus, the term "national interests" could render
nugatory any obligation to permit enemy civilians to depart a hostile
belligerent's territory.
Manifestly, neither in 1949, nor over thirty years later in the
context of modern armed conflict, does Article 35 strike anything
approaching the proper balance between the principles of military
necessity and of protection of enemy civilians. As Article 35 presently reads, the Detaining Power has the discretion to control enemy
civilians far beyond that which military necessity justifies. One recognizes that, in situations of armed conflict in which a state allocates
the overwhelming portion of its resources in support of that conflict,
146
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virtually every able-bodied person, from the early teenager to the
elderly, is in some way a potential contributor to the war effort.
However, this scenario envisions a "total war" armed conflict situation. Enemy civilians present in a hostile belligerent's territory at
the outbreak of conflict normally are a mere handful in comparison
to the total population of their country. Especially in the post-World
War II era of "limited" warfare, it is submitted that the potential
contribution to their country's armed effort or to the economic system of the hostile belligerent if they are detained represented by this
group of enemy civilians is indeed negligible. In response to the
position that certain enemy civilians may be inducted into military
service, it is noted that, in modern armed conflict, the sheer weight of
numbers in the field is much less important than in the past. In
today's world of sophisticated military weaponry, it is technological
skills and experience, especially that adaptable for military use, that
is vital. Additionally, the number of potential military personnel
represent€d by enemy civilians present in a hostile belligerent's
territory at outbreak of conflict is normally extremely small in relation to their country's population. Thus, even as regards this "core"
group of permissible detainees under past practice, it is suggested
that modern armed conflict situations do not warrant an automatic
blanket right of the hostile belligerent to hold these enemy civilians
in its territory. Finally, it should be recalled that in their harsh
restraint upon the expression of the freedom of personality, unnecessary detainment or internment are themselves highly deprivational.
In the circumstances of the particular individual affected, unnecessary detainment or internment may lead to gravely serious physical
and emotional suffering, even death.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the proper balance of
military necessity and the protection of enemy civilians requires
major revision of Article 35 of the Civilian Convention. First, the
provision should explicitly state the unrestricted right of all enemy
civilians to leave a hostile belligerent's territory, if they choose, and
then except from that blanket inclusion only the following categories
of persons: 25 enemy civilian males from sixteen to sixty years of age,
enemy civilian males of lesser or greater age and enemy civilian
females, to the extent that the law of the state of their nationality
renders them liable to bear arms and participate in combat operations, and any other enemy civilian possessing such skills or informa-

25 The focus in this discussion of Article 35 concerns only enemy civilians. The
'questionof the appropriateness of providing for other protected persons is not
addressed.
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tion that the civilian's departure from the Detaining Power's territory would manifestly present a significant threat to the security of
the belligerent.26
As to the first two excepted categories, it is proposed that Article
35 would provide further that those persons would have the right of
departure from the Detaining Power's territory to the territory of
the state of their nationality if their state and all of its co belligerents
gave solemn assurance that these protected persons would not be
accepted into their military services or permitted to serve in any
civilian capacity with the military services and their state authorized the Detaining Power's Protecting Power, or Substitute for the
Protecting Power, to determine and report that the assurances were
effective. The one exception to the Detaining Power's duty to permit
departure of these two categories of enemy civilians to their State of
nationality and, likewise, the one exception to the blanket, unrestricted departure authorization given to the general class of enemy
civilians, would be the particular instance in which the number of
persons departing was so great that their addition to the opposing
belligerent's economy manifestly would be a significant contribution. In that situation, enemy civilians in the number less than that
manifestly constituting a significant economic contribution to the
opposing belligerent would still be entitled to depart to their state of
nationality, with priority to families departing as units. If the two
requirements set forth for the departure of the first two excepted
categories were not met, or if the exceptional situation applied,
Article 35 would provide, finally, that those two categories of persons
or those of the general class of enemy civilians and of these two
categories who were prevented from departure to their state due to
application of the exceptional situation, had the right to depart to the
territory of a third State if a state party to the Civilian Convention
that was a neutral in the subject conflict offered its territory as a
place of internment for enemy civilians, whether actual administration of the internment regime was conducted by personnel of the
neutral state or of the Protecting Power for those enemy civilians, or
a Substitute for that Protecting Power, and that state, and any other
state or organization participating in administration of the internment regime gave solemn assurances of the use of best efforts to
retain these enemy civilians under the internment regime, to include
the duty to return to the Detaining Power's control any person who
attempted to breach the restrictions established.
26This

third category could overlap with the other two, such as in the case of a
thirty-two year old male nuclear physicist.
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With an eye to the "art of the possible" in any future negotiations on
the revision of Article 35, this proposal to deal with the freedom of
enemy civilians to depart from a hostile belligerent's own territory is
offered for governmental and scholarly consideration. Perhaps the
more difficult problem concerns the freedom of enemy civilians to
depart from occupied territory controlled by a hostile belligerent.

B. FREEDOM OF DEPARTURE FROM
OCCUPIED TERRITORY
For one to assume that enemy civilians present in occupied territory would prefer to remain there would be incorrect. First, some of
that class of protected persons might be nationals of a belligerent
state allied with the state whose territory is occupied. Those enemy
civilians might wish to depart to the territory of their home state or
elsewhere. They are, in effect, in much the same position as enemy
civilians present in the hostile belligerent's own territory and the
Civilian Convention in Article 48 incorporates Article 35 as governing their requests to depart. All of the foregoing discussion regarding the freedom of enemy civilians to depart from the hostile belligerent's home territory applies here with perhaps even stronger
criticism of the use of congruence with the hostile belligerent's
"national interests" as the standard to determine the enemy civilians'
rights of departure. The standards establishing the rights of control
of the Occupying Power in occupied territory are the necessities of
preserving military security and of maintaining the Occupying
Power's military occupation force and administrative officials and
the duty to perform the functions of government placed upon an
Occupying Power by the Civilian Convention and other conventional
and customary rules of armed conflict. Whatever may be the legitimate scope of "national interests" for a belligerent to consider in
restricting the right of an enemy civilian to depart from territory
over which the belligerent exercises full powers of sovereignty,
assuredly the scope of "national interests" that an Occupying Power
may apply in considering a departure request of an enemy civilian in
occupied territory must be limited by the narrower scope of authority possessed in such territory by an Occupying Power. The earlier
proposals for modifying Article 35 apply even more trenchently in
this situation.
As regards the freedom of enemy civilians who are nationals of the
state whose territory is occupied to depart from the occupied territory is only implicit under the Civilian Convention. Article 49 prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers or deportation of protected persons in occupied territory, with the proviso that evacua149
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tions of a given area are permissible if the security of the population
or imperative military reasons so demand. The Convention contains
no provision explicitly governing the right of these persons voluntarily to depart occupied territory. Pictet stated that the focus of the
drafters of the Civilian Convention was on prohibiting future forcible transfers and deportations such as those that brought death and
misery to millions in World War 11.27 The ICRC's draft at the negotiating conference absolutely prohibited deportations or transfers of
protected persons from occupied territory. 2s However, the Diplomatic Conference envisioned that some protected persons might
voluntarily wish to depart:
The Conference had particularly in mind the case of protected persons belonging to ethnic or political minorities
who might have sufference discrimination or persecution
on that account and might therefore wish to leave that
country. In order to make due allowances for that legitimate desire the Conference decided to authorize voluntary
transfers by implication, and only to prohibit "forcible"
transfer. 29
The shortcoming of this approach is that the nature of the right of
enemy civilians to depart from the occupied territory of the state of
their nationality is left unclear. Article 49 recognizes the freedom of
enemy civilians to leave areas "particularly exposed to the dangers of
war" with the limitation that the Occupying Power can prevent
departure if "the security of the population" (dangers of significantly
increased exposure to weaponry) or "imperative military reasons"
(hindrance of vital military operations) so demand. However, departure from occupied territory altogether is not mentioned. The implicitly recognized permissibility of voluntary transfers within or outside occupied territory seems a weak expression of a right to depart
occupied territory. Perhaps because these enemy civilians are
already in the territory of their state of nationality, the drafters of the
Civilian Convention did not think a provision explicitly recognizing
the right of departure from that territory was essential. The view
that very few of these enemy civilians automatically would have a
right of entry into another state's territory may have caused reluctance to speak of a right of departure from one's home territory.
Since the Occupying Power exercises broad powers of governance
27Pictet, supra note 8, at 278.
28See XIII International Red Cross Conference, Draft Revised or New Conventions
for the Protection of War Victims, Doc. 4a, at 173, quoted in Pictet, supra note 8, at 279.
28Jd.
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over enemy civilians present in occupied territory, the view was that
explicitly stating a right of departure, however restricted, was inappropriate. The response to this series of conjectures is, first, that for
many reasons, including past destruction and future risks of further
armed conflict, enemy civilians may wish to depart at least temporarily from occupied territory. Secondly, their own government may
be willing to accept them into territory it still controls, or third states
may be prepared to accept varying numbers of these protected persons, at least on a temporary basis. Thirdly, although the Occupying
Power exercises substantial powers of governance over enemy civilians in occupied territory, it is nevertheless a foreign state exercising
the limited power of belligerent occupation, not the comprehensive,
sovereign authority of the state of the enemy civilian's nationality.
Thus, it is suggested that the features of the implicit departure
right of enemy civilians who are present in occupied territory and
are nationals of the state whose territory is occupied are that they
have the right to depart unless prevented by "the security of the
population," or "imperative military reasons" of the Occupying
Power. To reduce those limitations to lesser generality, it is proposed
that the Occupying Power is entitled to prohibit dep&rture from
occupied territory only if the Occupying Power reasonably foresees
unavoidable, substantially increased risks of injury to these civilians
in the course of departure, due to the continuing armed conflict, or
due to the hazards of a massive, rapid exodus, the departure significantly threatens the continued ability of the Occupying Power to
have sufficient civilian manpower authorized by the Civilian Convention to support its occupation force and to perform government
functions required if the Occupying Power under the Civilian Convention and other rules of international law, or the departure were to
provide the opposing belligerent with a significant benefit in its war
effort. The emphasized words are to indicate that the Occupying
Power would be under the duty to take whatever reasonable actions
of regulation, management, and cooperation that are available to
support the right of voluntary departure and that only significant
adverse effect upon the interests of the Occupying Power justifies
prevention of departure. With the incorporation of these guidelines,
future negotiations should add an explicit provision on right of
departure for this class of enemy civilians much along the lines of
that proposed for modification of Article 35. The principal restraint
would be that any great number of able-bodied adult male or female
enemy civilians in occupied territory probably would not be entitled
to depart. Departure of a significant percentage of those persons
probably would significantly reduce the authorized civilian man151
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power needed by the Occupying Power. Additionally, if departure
was to other territory of the state of their nationality, it would probably contribute a significant military or economic benefit to the opposing belligerent. As discussed under Article 35, ultimate emphasis
would be on promoting the maximum authorized departure to neutral states willing to accept enemy civilians for internment.

IV. A FINAL PROPOSAL
The "treaty family" of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions stands as
one of the few examples of a series of comprehensive international
agreements in which participation is virtually universal and which
deal with many complex repetitive interactions in situations of vital
international concern, such as modern armed conflicts. Such agreements, however, contain no established, standing institutional agencies or arrangements for on-going research, data gathering, reporting, and recommendations for progressive development of the law
under the agreements. In the past, the laudable but ad hoc initiatives
taken have been due to the exceptional interest and drive of the
ICRC or a particularly interested state. The totality of the useful
institutional arrangements to promote the optimal effectiveness of
the Civilian Convention or all four of the 1949 Geneva Conventions is
a subject for another time. However, the need is self-evident for
establishing within the Conventions, and especially the Civilian
Convention, a small Secretariat and a Commission of Experts for the
promotion of on-going legal research, data gathering, and preparation of proposals for consideration of the parties as regards interpretation and modification of the Conventions or enactment of parallel
implementing national legislation. For the f].lture, promotion study
and consultation on proposed modifications of substantive provisions, such as those offered here, is important. However, perhaps of
, greater long-term significance would be efforts by the ICRC and
' interested parties to encourage consultation on creation of various
institutional arrangements to enhance the effectiveness and progressive development of humanitarian law of armed conflict under
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. If even a modicum of success in
advancing those objectives resulted, those efforts would have served
"the interests of humanity and the ever progressive needs of
civilization."30

30

Hague Convention, Preamble.
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